Historical sources

A historical sources book containing seen and unseen sources will be provided in the examination for Paper Two.

The seen sources are overleaf.

You must use a range of seen and unseen sources and reference them in your response.

Enquiries

Telephone (07) 3120 6180 or email externalexams@qcaa.qld.edu.au.
Source 1 — The contribution of Marxism–Leninism

Marxism–Leninism helped the Chinese for a number of reasons. In the pre-war period it gave them the confidence and moral support of belonging to a world movement; it claimed to be scientific and therefore modern; it was disliked by the Western countries and therefore acceptable to Chinese who felt let down by the West; it was optimistic in its assurance that the stage of feudalism must lead through capitalism to socialism; it provided a rationale and a programme for putting ordinary people in the centre of the picture while insisting that an elite group (the Communist Party) must always lead.

Moreover, it fitted into the Chinese traditional pattern of an authority-centred society, dominated by an educated elite held together by a common philosophy and commitment to the service of the state.

Milston, G 1978, A Short History of China

Source 2 — The Communists and nationalism

The Communists, for their part, after shedding the theoretical internationalism that had hampered their early efforts, could plausibly claim to be more nationalist than the Nationalists, and indeed are the only real nationalists. Whatever may have been the hidden thoughts and real feelings of the two parties during the war with Japan and the civil war, the evidence is beyond dispute; it was the Chinese Revolution, and only the Chinese Revolution that brought the Chinese nationalism into fruition ...


Source 3 — Mao on the peasants and revolution

Without the poor peasants it would never have been possible to bring about in the countryside the present state of revolution, to overthrow the local bullies and bad gentry, or to complete the democratic revolution. Being the most revolutionary, the poor peasants have won the leadership in the peasant association. [...] This leadership of the poor peasants is absolutely necessary. Without the poor peasants there can be no revolution. To reject them is to reject the revolution. To attack them is to attack the revolution. Their general direction of the revolution has never been wrong.

de Bary, WT et al. 1999, Sources of Chinese Tradition

Source 4 — The Hundred Flowers campaign of 1957

Known as the Hundred Flowers campaign, Mao’s new policy had a dramatic effect. For the next several weeks, China’s intellectuals answered the Chairman’s call for criticism with a vengeance derived from years of CCP oppression. Finding itself the subject of serious criticism, the Party soon repealed its newly adopted liberal policy and placed the intellectuals under even more strict control. Despite its early demise, however, the Hundred Flowers campaign had far-reaching effects on the direction of the People’s Republic of China and the CCP’s view of intellectual debate. Under Mao’s leadership, these policies hindered China’s modernisation efforts and would eventually culminate in the disastrous Cultural Revolution.

Jackson, JM 2004, An Early Spring: Mao Tse-tung, the Chinese Intellectuals and the Hundred Flowers Campaign
Source 5 — Great Leap Forward (1956–1960)

The people’s communes are good, 1958

A poster for schools shows the ideal people’s commune, with a rich harvest, backyard furnaces, communal facilities for eating and washing, a centre for the elderly, and the people’s militia.

Landsberger, SR & The International Institute of Social History 1958

Source 6 — Beijing Red Guard: Long live the revolutionary rebel spirit of the proletariat

Revolution is rebellion, and rebellion is the soul of Mao Tse-Tung’s thought. We hold that tremendous attention must be paid to the word ‘application’, that is, mainly to the word ‘rebellion’. Daring to think, to speak, to act, to break through, and to make revolution, in a word, daring to rebel, is the most fundamental and most precious quality of proletarian revolutionaries. This is the fundamental principle of the proletarian Party spirit! Not to rebel is revisionism, pure and simple!

Revisionism had been in control of the school for seventeen years. If we do not rise up in rebellion today, when are we going to? [...] We are bent on creating a tremendous proletarian uproar, and hewing out a proletarian new world! Long live the revolutionary rebel spirit of the proletariat!

Source 7 — The Cultural Revolution

ʻRender new service for the peopleʼ, February 1968

Landsberger, SR & The International Institute of Social History

Source 8 — Two statements by Deng Xiaoping about the need for reform in China

If we do not carry out reform (political and economic) now, our cause of modernisation and socialism will be ruined. (1978)

As economic reform progresses, we deeply feel the necessity for change in the political structure. The absence of such change will hamper the development of productive forces. (1986)

Burke, P 1999, Heinemann Outcomes: Studies of Asia

Source 9 — Dengʼs four modernisations

Deng and his supporters realised that without economic advances, the future position of the CCP would be untenable. The goal therefore became the succinctly stated ‘Four Modernisations’ originally put forward by Premier Zhou in the 1970s: modernisation of agriculture, industry, national defence, and science and technology. The most important of the four was the modernisation of agriculture from agricultural production. Unlike the earlier Maoist policies, which were hastily designed and quickly implemented, the new approach called for experimentation with changes in just a few years before beginning wider reforms.

Benson, L 2016, China Since 1949
Source 10 — Official view of Mao, post-Cultural Revolution

Before and after the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, the Party led and supported the large-scale debate about whether practice is the sole criterion for testing the truth. The nationwide debate smashed the traditional personality cult of Chairman Mao Zedong and shattered the argument of the ‘two whatevers’†, the notion pursued by then Party Chairman Hua Guofeng after the death of Chairman Mao. The erroneous notion included that whatever policy decisions Mao had made must be firmly upheld and whatever instructions he had given must be followed unswervingly. The statement first appeared in an editorial entitled ‘Study the Documents Carefully and Grasp the Key Link’, which was published simultaneously in the People’s Daily, the Liberation Army Daily, and later in the monthly journal Hongqi, or the Red Flag. The debate upheld again the ideological principles of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and brought order out of chaos.

†We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.

Source 11 — China’s Communist Party: Different in all but its name

It’s an old Chinese proverb: Change the substance, but don’t change the name. As China’s Communist Party meets in preparation for a complete turnover of top leaders expected tomorrow, that proverb rings like a Beijing bell tower.

A party that once doted on former Chairman Mao Zedong’s ‘little red book’ and sought to export its ‘forever correct’ aphorisms worldwide is undergoing major alterations to its core ideology and identity. The change is part of an effort to keep pace with market forces and national sentiments already far advanced in Chinese society.

After 13 years at the helm, President Jiang Zemin is stepping down, though he is expected to retain many levers of power and influence. The tone he is setting is clear: China is open for business.

Communism, in turn, is increasingly outdated in a party that now seeks legitimacy by appealing to a proud 5 000-year-old Chinese national identity.

Marquand, R 2002, China’s Communist Party – different in all but its name

Source 12 — Ideology for the Communist Party in the 21st century

China has been called a ‘post-Communist society’. Marxism and the other dominant thought forms on which the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came to power, and exercised that power from 1949, have been buried. It has been described as a system now guided by pragmatism and by simply finding what works to deliver the all important economic growth. And yet, the language that elite Chinese leaders of the ‘fourth generation’ use often seems to contradict this. In their use of terms, in the ways in which they frame the world, and in the moral and intellectual justifications that they invoke for policy, there does seem to be ideology. In comments made in early 2012, Party Secretary and President Hu Jintao wrote of the hostile intent of western powers and ‘their efforts […] to divide us’, and referred to the fact that ‘the international culture of the west is strong while we are weak […] Ideological and cultural fields are our main target.’


End of Seen sources
Seen sources (1–12)

Source 1
Milston, G 1978, A Short History of China, Cassell, Sydney, NSW.

Source 2

Source 3

Source 4

Source 5

Source 6

Source 7

Source 8
Burke P 1999, Heinemann Outcomes: Studies of Asia, Melbourne, VIC.

Source 9
Benson, L 2016, China Since 1949, Routledge, London UK.

Source 10

Source 11

Source 12

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