2014 Senior External Examination

Modern History
Paper Two — Historical sources book

Friday 31 October 2014
1 pm to 3:40 pm

Directions
You may write in this book during perusal time.

Contents

• Seen sources (Sources A–N)
• Unseen sources (Sources 1–13)
• Acknowledgments

After the examination session
Take this book when you leave.
Planning space
The spelling of Chinese names may occur in either the older Wade-Giles form or the more recently adopted Pinyin form, e.g. Guangzhou (Canton), depending on the time frame of the origin of the source. Names like Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) are, however, readily recognisable in either form.

**Seen sources (Sources A–N)**

**Source A**

**The Communists and nationalism**

The Communists, for their part, after shedding the theoretical internationalism that had hampered their early efforts, could plausibly claim to be more nationalist than the Nationalists, and indeed the only real nationalists. Whatever may have been the hidden thoughts and real feelings of the two parties during the war with Japan and the civil war, the evidence is beyond dispute; it was the Chinese Revolution, and only the Chinese Revolution that brought the Chinese nationalism to fruition …


**Source B**

**The Mandate of Heaven: the basis of imperial rule**

The Chinese developed a way to explain these changes of dynasties; they called it the Mandate of Heaven. They believed that the emperor ruled by the will of Heaven; indeed the emperor was sometimes called the Son of Heaven and his throne was called the Celestial (Heavenly) Throne. He had the mandate (authority or permission) of Heaven to rule the people as long as he ruled wisely.

Because the emperor had the authority of Heaven, the people had a duty to obey him. The idea of the Mandate of Heaven was linked to the teachings of Confucius. He had taught that society was based on different relationships. In the family the father had authority over his family; in the country the emperor had authority over his people.


**Source C**

**The contribution of Marxism–Leninism**

Marxism–Leninism helped the Chinese for a number of reasons. In the pre-war period it gave them the confidence and moral support of belonging to a world movement; it claimed to be scientific and therefore modern; it was disliked by the Western countries and therefore acceptable to Chinese who felt let down by the West; it was optimistic in its assurance that the stage of feudalism must lead through capitalism to socialism; it provided a rationale and a programme for putting ordinary people in the centre of the picture while insisting that an elite group (the Communist Party) must always lead.

Moreover, it fitted into the Chinese traditional pattern of authority-centred society, dominated by an educated elite held together by a common philosophy and commitment to the service of the state.

Milston, G 1978, *A Short History of China*
Source D

The Proclamation of the People’s Republic of China, 1 October 1949

We proclaim the establishment of the People’s Republic of China. Our nation will from now on enter the large family of peace-loving and freedom-loving nations of the world. It will work bravely and industriously to create its own civilisation and happiness and will, at the same time, promote world peace and freedom. Our nation will never again be an insulted nation. We have stood up. Our revolution has gained the sympathy and acclamation of the broad masses throughout the entire world. We have friends everywhere the world over.

Zedong, M 1950, On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship
**Source E**

China and the First Five Year Plan

Influenced by Russian engineers, and also by the success of Stalin’s Five Year Plans, China introduced its own Five Year Plan in 1953. Heavy industry was targeted as being in need of major reform. The Five Year Plan attempted to tackle steel, coal and iron production. As in the Russian model, each factory or mine was given a target to achieve.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1957 planned</th>
<th>1957 actual output</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Coal</td>
<td>63.0</td>
<td>113.0</td>
<td>124.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pig iron</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chemical fertiliser</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source F**

The 100 Flowers Movement

‘[The slogan of] “Let a hundred flowers bloom, a hundred schools of thought contend” … was put forward in recognition of the various different contradictions in society … If you want to grow only [fragrant flowers] and not weeds, it can’t be done … To ban all weeds, and stop them growing, is that possible? The reality is that it is not. They will still grow … it is difficult to distinguish fragrant flowers from poisonous weeds …’

Mao Zedong, quoted in Short, P 1999, *Mao: A Life*

**Source G**

The Meaning of 100 Flowers

‘At the time of Mao’s call for free expression, one historian warned that intellectuals “have to guess to what extent” if the call is sincere, flowers will be allowed to blossom, and whether the [policy will be reversed] once the flowers are in bloom. They have to guess whether [it] is an end, or just a means … to unearth [hidden] thoughts and rectify individuals. They have to guess which problems can be discussed, and which problems cannot be discussed.’

Jian Bozan, quoted in Short, P 1999, *Mao: A Life*
The Great Leap Forward (1958–1962)

As a result of the successful economic reconstruction that had taken place in the early 1950s under the First Five Year Plan, the Party leadership headed by Mao Zedong considered the conditions ripe for a Great Leap Forward in early 1958. The Chinese people were to go all out in a concerted effort to surpass England in 15 (or even less) years and to make the transition from socialism to communism at the same time, thereby leaving the Soviet Union far behind.

‘Brave the wind and the waves, everything has remarkable abilities’ (1958)

http://chineseposters.net
Source I

‘Criticise the old world and build a new world with Mao Zedong Thought as a weapon.’
http://chineseposters.net

Source J
Mao’s contribution

Mao Tse-Tung’s great accomplishment has been to change Marxism from a European to an Asiatic form … China is a semi-feudal, semi-colonial country in which vast numbers of people live at the edge of starvation, tilling small bits of soil … In attempting the transition to a more industrial economy, China faces the pressures … of advanced industrial lands … There are similar conditions in other lands of Southeast Asia — the course chosen by China will influence them all.

(From an interview between Liu Shaoqi (Head of State, 1959–1968) and Anna Louise Strong in 1946)

Source K

Deng Xiaoping outlines China’s economic aims, 1982

Invigorating our domestic economy and opening to the outside world are our long-term, not short-term, policies that will remain unchanged for at least 50 or 70 years. Our modernisation program is a socialist program, not anything else. All our policies for carrying out reform, opening to the outside world and invigorating the domestic economy are designed to develop the socialist economy. We allow the development of individual economy, of joint ventures with both Chinese and foreign investment and of enterprises wholly owned by foreign businessmen, but socialist public ownership will always remain predominant. The aim of socialism is to make all people prosperous, not to create polarisation.


Source L

Two statements by Deng Xiaoping about the need for reform in China

If we do not carry out reform (political and economic) now, our cause of modernisation and socialism will be ruined. (1978)

As economic reform progresses, we deeply feel the necessity for change in the political structure. The absence of such change will hamper the development of productive forces. (1986)

Burke, P 1999, Heinemann Outcomes: Studies of Asia

Source M

Has the Chinese Communist Party transformed itself since 1978?

Overall, it seems clear that the CCP has undergone a significant transformation since 1978. Many aspects of the Party including its composition and the declining role of ideology would be unrecognisable to the Maoist era, whilst Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao have emphasised ‘absolute stability at any cost’, a striking contrast from Mao’s chaotic regime. The importance of maintaining political stability in order to facilitate economic development has become central to the party’s role, and the declining significance of ideology has resulted in a ‘shift in the party’s fundamental legitimacy to its capacity to deliver the economic goods’. To a large extent, the institutionalisation and reform program has achieved this stability, but major problems such as widespread corruption remain. However, the Party has adopted a dynamic approach to development and appears flexible in dealing with the challenges of the contemporary world whilst still maintaining its iron grip on power.

Hawkes, S 2011, ‘Has the Chinese Communist Party transformed itself since 1978?’
1989
CHINA

2009
CHINA

I SEE WE'VE
ACQUIRED
HUMMER
**Unseen sources (Sources 1–13)**

**Source 1**

The differences between the Communists and the Nationalists

The US Ambassador in China at the time recorded the following observations.

… This Party [Nationalists] almost from the time it came into power had tolerated among its officials of all grades, graft and greed, idleness and inefficiency … These evils had become even more pronounced after VJ Day in the attempts to crush Communism by a combination of military strength and secret police … In painful contrast the CP was free from private graft. Officers and men lived very much together, simply and industriously, severely disciplined, thoroughly indoctrinated. All this was evident as they came to Nanking. There was almost no mistreatment of the populace … Their morale was excellent. The daily drills and lectures went on all round our Embassy property … The CP was thus giving the appearance of being a dynamic movement, fostering among millions those qualities of which China had stood so in need.

(From Stuart, J 1954, *50 Years in China*, Random House, New York)


**Source 2**


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
<td>GDP growth rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% per annum)</td>
<td>(% per annum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
<td>Inflation rate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(% per annum)</td>
<td>(% per annum)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952 not available</td>
<td>1984 14.5 12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953 14.0</td>
<td>1985 12.9 1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954 5.8</td>
<td>1986 8.5 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955 6.4</td>
<td>1987 11.1 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956 14.1</td>
<td>1988 11.3 2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957 4.5</td>
<td>1989 4.3 3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958 22.0</td>
<td>1990 3.9 7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959 8.2</td>
<td>1991 8.0 2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960 −1.4</td>
<td>1992 13.6 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961 −29.7</td>
<td>1993 13.4 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962 −6.5</td>
<td>1994 11.8 4.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

‘Chairman Mao teaches us: It is up to us to organise the people. As for the reactionaries in China, it is up to us to organise the people to overthrow them. Revolutionary Rebel factions unite to wage the Proletarian Cultural Revolution to the end! ’

http://chineseposters.net

Source 4

The policy of ‘de-Maoisation’

The policy of ‘de-Maoisation’ was accelerated in 1978–81, as the new moderate leadership pushed further along the paths of modernisation and increased cooperation with the industrial West. The policy of ‘Four Modernisations’ — in industry, agriculture, defence and technology — stressed practical achievement. Experts and specialists were again to be respected, education was to have high priority and material incentives were restored. The policy also implied an inevitable strengthening of relationships with capitalist powers, which could provide the investment, products and expertise China needed to achieve these goals. Foreign technology and technical imports were actively sought.

Cowie, HR 1987, Asia and Australia in World Affairs, vol. 3
Source 5

Nationalism in China: historian’s views

‘Chinese nationalism was actually partly a creation of Western imperialism,’ says Minxin Pei, a senior associate in the China program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Pei says the first surge of Chinese nationalism was seen in 1919 in what’s now widely referred to as the May 4th Movement when thousands of students demonstrated against the Treaty of Versailles’ transfer of Chinese territory to Japan. Some of these student leaders went on to form the Chinese Communist Party two years later in 1921. ‘The current Chinese communist government is more a product of nationalism than a product of ideology like Marxism and Communism,’ says Liu Kang, a professor of Chinese cultural studies at Duke University. Kang says today nationalism has probably ‘become the most powerful legitimating ideology.’

Bajoria, J 2008, Nationalism in China

Source 6

Modernisation

Given China’s backwardness, modernisation would require assistance from foreign countries. During the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese government had put up barriers against influence from outside and its foreign relations were in general very constricted. But Deng Xiaoping instituted the slogan ‘openness to the outside’ (duiwai kaifang) and set about improving relations with foreign countries, especially those which he believed were in a position to help China’s modernisation.

Mackerras, C, Taneja, P & Young, G 1994, China since 1978: Reform, Modernisation and ‘Socialism with Chinese Characteristics’

Source 7

Official view of Mao, post-Cultural Revolution

Before and after the convocation of the Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, the Party led and supported the large-scale debate about whether practice is the sole criterion for testing truth. The nationwide debate smashed the traditional personality cult of Chairman Mao Zedong and shattered the argument of the ‘two whatevers’*, the notion pursued by then Party Chairman Hua Guofeng after the death of Chairman Mao. The erroneous notion included that whatever policy decisions Mao had made must be firmly upheld and whatever instructions he had given must be followed unswervingly. The statement first appeared in an editorial entitled ‘Study the Documents Carefully and Grasp the Key Link’, which was published simultaneously in the People's Daily, the Liberation Army Daily and later in the monthly journal Hongqi, or the Red Flag. The debate upheld again the ideological principles of emancipating the mind and seeking truth from facts and brought order out of chaos.

* ‘We will resolutely uphold whatever policy decisions Chairman Mao made, and unswervingly follow whatever instructions Chairman Mao gave.’

The Central People’s Government of The People's Republic of China
Source 8
The threat to the post-Mao consensus

The last emperor of China was Mao Zedong. One of Deng Xiaoping’s most important achievements after Mao’s death was to rid the system of an all-powerful head, the charismatic figure around which the whole system revolved. The Mandate of Heaven perished in 1976, which is why the pre- and post-Maoist political systems have almost nothing in common despite the fact that they were both nominally communist.


Source 9
China’s Communist Party different in all but its name

It’s an old Chinese proverb: Change the substance, but don’t change the name. As China’s Communist Party meets in preparation for a complete turnover of top leaders expected tomorrow, that proverb rings like a Beijing bell tower.

A party that once doted on former Chairman Mao Zedong’s ‘little red book’ and sought to export its ‘forever correct’ aphorisms worldwide is undergoing major alterations to its core ideology and identity. The change is part of an effort to keep pace with market forces and national sentiments already far advanced in Chinese society.

After 13 years at the helm, President Jiang Zemin is stepping down, though he is expected to retain many levers of power and influence. The tone he is setting is clear: China is open for business. Communism, in turn, is increasingly outdated in a party that now seeks legitimacy by appealing to a proud 5000-year-old Chinese national identity.

The Christian Science Monitor, 14 November 2002 (US magazine)

Source 10
China’s success, censored

Source 11

Land of hope and opportunity


Source 12

How China became capitalist

The combination of rapid economic liberalisation and seemingly unchanged politics has led many to characterise China’s market economy as state-led, authoritarian capitalism, which many people have rightly recognised as fragile and unsustainable. When and how China will embrace democracy, and whether the Party will survive democratisation, are the main questions asked about China’s political future. In our book, a different perspective is offered. It provides a different diagnosis of the main flaw of the Chinese market economy: China has developed a robust market for goods, but it still lacks a free market for ideas.

25th-Year Anniversary of the Tiananmen Student Movement

Source 13

www.mw.nl
Acknowledgments

Seen sources

Source A

Source B

Source C

Source D

Source E

Source F

Source G

Source H

Source I

Source J

Source K

Source L
Source M

Source N

Unseen sources

Source 1

Source 2

Source 3

Source 4

Source 5

Source 6

Source 7

Source 8

Source 9

Source 10
Source 11

Source 12

Source 13

Every reasonable effort has been made to contact owners of copyright material. We would be pleased to hear from any copyright owner who has been omitted or incorrectly acknowledged.